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UBER AND THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT:  
WHY THE RIDE-HAILING APP WOULD NOT FARE WELL UNDER 
§ 230 
Adeline A. Allen* 
ABSTRACT 
Uber, a company that offers ride-sharing arrangements 
through its smartphone app, has quickly grown in popularity. As 
Uber grows in widespread use, injuries involving rides arranged 
through Uber have been on the rise. Uber maintains that it is a 
technology platform that connects users on its app, not a 
transportation company. Such a characterization would render 
Uber immune from suits for injuries involving the ride 
arrangements under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230 (2012). The statute offers robust protection for web-based 
companies from liability for content provided by third parties. This 
article seeks to consider whether Uber’s business model properly 
allows it to be under the protection of the Communications 
Decency Act. Given Uber’s roles in setting the price for the ride 
and in heavily controlling the connection between passenger and 
driver, this article argues that more than a platform, Uber is a 
content provider in the ride-sharing arrangement and is thus 
disqualified from Communications Decency Act immunity. 
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It was New Year’s Eve in San Francisco.1 A mother and her 
two young children were walking home through the city after a 
visit with the children’s grandmother.2 The family stepped down 
the sidewalk, making their way to cross the street, when a driver in 
an SUV, making a right turn onto the street, hit them in the 
                                                
 1 This event occurred on December 31, 2013. Ex-Uber Driver Charged with 
Manslaughter in Death of 6-Year-Old, TIME (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://time.com/3625556/uber-manslaughter-charge-san-francisco/. 
 2 Patrick Hoge, Dead Girl’s Family Steps into Legislator’s Insurance Fight 
over Uber, Lyft, BIZJOURNALS: TECHFLASH (June 26, 2014, 3:05 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/06/uber-lyft-
insurance-sofia-liu-susan-bonilla.html. 
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crosswalk.3 The mother and her four-year-old son were injured.4 
Six-year-old Sofia Liu died from her injuries.5 
The driver was driving for Uber,6 a ride-sharing company that 
connects passengers and drivers through an app on their phones.7 
He was driving around with the Uber app open on his smartphone 
while waiting to pick up a fare.8 The driver was later charged with 
vehicular manslaughter,9 but in the words of Sofia’s mother, Huan 
Hua Kuang, “[W]hat about Uber?”10 
This article seeks to explore Uber’s liability when rides 
arranged through its app cause injury to bystanders, as in the case 
of Sofia Liu’s family, or to its own passengers and drivers.11 
                                                
 3  See Josh Constine, Uber’s Denial of Liability in Girls’ Death Raises 
Accident Accountability Questions, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-insurance-
whenever-their-driver-app-is-open/; TIME, supra note 1. 
 4 Constine, supra note 3; TIME, supra note 1; Hoge, supra note 2. 
 5 Jay Barmann, Uber Reaches Wrongful Death Settlement with Family of 
Sofia Liu, SFIST (July 15, 2015, 10:10 AM), 
http://sfist.com/2015/07/15/uber_reaches_wrongful_death_settlem.php; 
Constine, supra note 3; TIME, supra note 1; Hoge, supra note 2. 
 6 Barmann, supra note 5; TIME, supra note 1; David Streitfeld, Uber and a 
Child’s Death, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/uber-and-a-childs-death/?_r=0. 
 7 How Does Uber Work?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/738d1ff7-5fe0-4383-
b34c-4a2480efd71e (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 8 Barmann, supra note 5; TIME, supra note 1; Streitfeld, supra note 6. 
 9 Barmann, supra note 5; Carolyn Tyler, Mother of Girl Fatally Struck by 
Uber Driver Speaks Out, ABC 7 NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://abc7news.com/business/mother-of-girl-fatally-struck-by-uber-driver-
speaks-out/429535/. 
 10 Tyler, supra note 9; see also TIME, supra note 1. 
 11 Sofia Liu’s family filed suit against Uber. The parties reached a settlement 
for an undisclosed amount in 2015. Barmann, supra note 5; Tracey Lien, Uber 
Settles Wrongful-Death Lawsuit in San Francisco, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2015, 
5:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-sofia-liu-uber-
settlement-20150714-story.html; Streitfeld, supra note 6. Other incidents 
include a driver in New York City allegedly crashing into a couple in a 
crosswalk, killing the man and injuring the woman; a driver in Los Angeles 
allegedly driving under the influence, causing the car to flip over with the 
passenger inside; a driver in San Francisco allegedly smashing a passenger’s 
face with a hammer, resulting in severe eye injury; and a driver in Hawaii 
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Specifically, this article examines whether Uber would qualify for 
the protection of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                         
allegedly raping a teenage passenger. Injuries are not limited to Uber passengers 
or bystanders on the street. Drivers, too, have been injured. For example, a 
driver in Los Angeles was allegedly hit by a passenger, breaking his jaw in two 
places; while another driver in San Francisco was allegedly attacked by a 
passenger, landing him in the hospital with facial injuries. Brad Aaron, Crash 
Victim Lawsuit: App Use by Uber Drivers Is Negligent and Illegal, 
STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.streetsblog.org/2015/03/20/crash-victim-lawsuit-app-use-by-uber-
drivers-is-negligent-and-illegal/; Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye 
from Driver’s Hammer Attack. Could Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 
2014, 9:37 PM) [hereinafter Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye], 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack-
liability/#4acdc5455999; Ellen Huet, What Happens to Uber Drivers and Other 
Sharing Economy Workers Injured on the Job?, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2015, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/01/06/workers-compensation-uber-
drivers-sharing-economy/#62b6fa084c78; Sage Lazzaro, A Hawaii Uber Driver 
Has Been Charged with Raping a Teenage Passenger, OBSERVER (Apr. 20, 2016, 
2:26 PM), http://observer.com/2016/04/a-hawaii-uber-driver-has-been-charged-
with-raping-a-teenager/; San Francisco Uber Driver Attacked by Passenger, 
Suspect Under Arrest, CBS SF BAY AREA (Nov. 28, 2014, 3:49 PM), 
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/11/28/san-francisco-uber-driver-attacked-
by-passenger-suspect-under-arrest-anza-vista-aggravated-assault/; Uber Driver 
Arrested on Suspicion of DUI After New Year’s Day Crash, CBS LOS ANGELES 
(Jan. 4, 2016, 11:31 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2016/01/04/uber-
driver-arrested-on-suspicion-of-dui-after-new-years-day-crash/. Uber does 
maintain some insurance for its drivers, a two-tiered structure of coverage for 
(1) the time period between turning on the app and accepting a ride and (2) the 
time period between accepting a ride and dropping off the passenger at the 
conclusion of the ride. Certificates of Insurance—U.S. Ridesharing, UBER 
NEWSROOM (Jan. 11, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/certificates-of-
insurance-u-s-ridesharing/. Additionally, Uber also requires drivers to carry 
personal auto insurance, many of which offer specific rideshare insurance 
policies. Harry Campbell, Rideshare Insurance Options for Uber and Lyft 
Drivers, THE RIDESHARE GUY (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://therideshareguy.com/rideshare-insurance-options-for-drivers/; Ellen Huet, 
New Laws Push Uber and Lyft To Bump Up Insurance Coverage, but a 
Collision Gap Remains, FORBES (July 1, 2015, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/new-laws-push-uber-and-lyft-
to-bump-up-insurance-coverage-but-a-collision-gap-remains/#5d242ceb107c; 
Driving Jobs vs. Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs 
(last visited June 29, 2016). 
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§ 230 (2012).12 The statute robustly protects interactive computer 
services from liability for content provided by a third party.13 A 
legendary law in the development of the Internet, the statute has 
insulated a host of web companies, 14  from Internet service 
providers like Google,15 retail sites like Amazon,16 and social media 
sites like Facebook,17 to sharing economy sites like StubHub,18 
from a whole host of civil liabilities. 19  Indeed, the statute’s 
protection is oft invoked in Silicon Valley.20 
Uber contends that it is a technology platform that connects 
passengers and drivers as users of its app, not a transportation 
company. This characterization is important, as it would usually 
invoke the protection of the Communications Decency Act, thus 
insulating Uber from suits by any passenger, driver, or bystander. 
But given Uber’s practices of setting the price for the ride21 and 
heavily controlling the connection between passenger and driver,22 
this article argues that Uber is more than a platform, but rather is a 
                                                
    12 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See Claire Cain Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet the Real World, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/when-uber-
lyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html?_r=0. 
 15 E.g., Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 
2010); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197–99 (N.D. Cal. 
2009); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 16 E.g., Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. 
Wash. 2014); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 17 E.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 18 E.g., Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 564 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 19  For example, “[t]hat is why Yelp avoids liability when people post 
inaccurate or abusive restaurant reviews, and why YouTube does not have to 
remove videos that some find offensive.” Miller, supra note 14; see also infra 
note 57. 
 20 See Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye, supra note 11; Miller, supra note 14. 
 21 See infra Part III(A). 
 22 See infra Part III(B). 
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content provider in the ride-sharing arrangement and is thus 
disqualified from Communications Decency Act immunity.23 
                                                
 23 Uber has been involved in a high-profile class action lawsuit brought by its 
drivers in California and Massachusetts, in which the drivers argued that they 
had been misclassified as independent contractors working for Uber, while they 
should have been classified as employees instead. See Shannon Liss-Riordan & 
Adelaide Pagano, Breaking News, UBER LAWSUIT 1, 1 (2016), 
http://uberlawsuit.com/Breaking%20news%20-
%20Uber%20will%20pay%20$100%20million%20to%20settle%20independent
%20contractor%20misclassification%20claims.pdf. Legal experts disagree as to 
the effect of the classification of these drivers on Uber’s immunity under the 
Communications Decency Act. One view is that if drivers were to be classified 
as employees, Uber may very well be legally responsible under respondeat 
superior for the accidents and injuries caused by its drivers. See Venkat 
Balasubramani, Court Says Uber and Lyft Drivers May Be Employees, TECH. & 
MKTG. L. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/03/court-says-uber-and-lyft-drivers-
may-be-employees.htm. 
But Professor Eric Goldman, an Internet Law scholar, opines in his Technology 
& Marketing Law Blog that the Communications Decency Act may still 
immunize Uber from liability even if its drivers are classified as employees. See 
Eric Goldman, Is Uber Liable When Drivers Sexually Abuse Passengers?, TECH. 
& MKTG. L. BLOG (May 17, 2016), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/05/is-uber-liable-when-drivers-
sexually-abuse-passengers-forbes-cross-post.htm. A proposed settlement of 
$100 million in the Uber class action suit was rejected by the court in August 
2016. See Order Denying Plantiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval at 34, 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 
2016). But even if a new agreement were to be reached (possibly for a much 
smaller class due to a recent Ninth Circuit ruling that the drivers would be bound 
by arbitration), such a settlement would leave unresolved the legal issue of 
whether the drivers are independent contractors or employees. See Goldman, 
supra; Liss-Riordan & Pagano, supra. See generally Mohamed v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). It is worth noting that the California Labor 
Commissioner’s Office, in considering the issue on a separate matter, ruled that 
Uber drivers are employees of the company. See Order, Decision or Award of 
the Labor Commissioner at 10, Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK 
(Labor Comm’r Cal. June 3, 2015); Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California 
Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-labor-
ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html?_r=0.). On the heels of the 
aforementioned lawsuit, a new class action lawsuit on the same issue of driver 
status misclassification was recently filed in a federal district court in Illinois by 
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Part I of this article discusses the rise of Uber and the sharing 
economy. Part II discusses the Communications Decency Act and 
how courts have interpreted its provisions. Part III explores how 
the Communications Decency Act would be applied to Uber and 
why Uber would not be immune under the statute. 
I. UBER AND THE SHARING ECONOMY 
Uber is a ride-sharing app company, self-described as “a 
technology platform . . . [that] connect[s] driver-partners and 
riders”24 through a smartphone app. The company’s rapid rise in its 
short history is astounding. Since the company’s founding in 
2009,25 it has grown to expand operations in 540 cities around the 
world,26 taking the taxi and rental car industries by storm27 (or 
                                                                                                         
drivers outside of California and Massachusetts. See Megan Rose Dickey, Uber 
Is Facing a Nationwide Class-Action Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (May 2, 2016), 
http://techcrunch.com/2016/05/02/uber-is-facing-a-nationwide-class-action-
lawsuit/; Erik Sherman, Uber Faces New Class Action Suit by Drivers, FORBES 
(May 4, 2016, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/05/04/will-a-new-class-action-
suit-change-uber-or-cause-drivers-to-permanently-lose/#6212eb71277a. 
 24 How Does Uber Work?, supra note 7; see also Stephanie Francis Ward, 
‘App’ Me a Ride, 100 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13–14, 17. 
 25 See Travis Kalanick, Uber’s Founding, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 22, 2010), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/ubers-founding/. 
 26 Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story (last visited Nov. 17, 
2016). 
 27 See, e.g., Andrew Bender, Uber’s Astounding Rise: Overtaking Taxis in 
Key Markets, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2015, 11:42 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2015/04/10/ubers-astounding-rise-
overtaking-taxis-in-key-markets/#ac00acd22ef6; Jon Liss, Uber and the Taxi 
Industry’s Last Stand, THE NATION (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/uber-and-taxi-industrys-last-stand/; Dana 
Rubinstein, Uber, Lyft, and the End of Taxi History, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2014, 
5:27 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-
hall/story/2014/10/uber-lyft-and-the-end-of-taxi-history-017042; Olivia Zaleski, 
Uber Overtakes Rental Cars Among Business Travelers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 
2016, 3:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-21/uber-
overtakes-rental-cars-among-business-travelers. 
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“disrupting” the industries, as the tech lingo goes), 28  and has 
caused massive protests and demonstrations by taxi drivers the 
world over.29 One of Silicon Valley’s biggest success stories30 and 
                                                
 28 Compare Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-
innovation, with Alex Moazed & Nicholas L. Johnson, Why Clayton Christensen 
Is Wrong About Uber and Disruptive Innovation, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2016), 
http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/27/why-clayton-christensen-is-wrong-about-
uber-and-disruptive-innovation/. 
 29  See, e.g., Anti-Uber Protests Around the Worlds, in Pictures, THE 
TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/picture-
galleries/11902080/Anti-Uber-protests-around-the-world-in-pictures.html (last 
visited June 14, 2016); Lori Aratani, Downtown D.C. Traffic Gridlocked as Taxi 
Drivers Protest Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/06/25/d-c-taxi-
drivers-stage-caravan-to-protest-uber-lyft-sidecar/; Bogota Taxi Drivers Protest 
Against Uber, EURONEWS (Mar. 15, 2016, 2:50 AM), 
http://www.euronews.com/2016/03/15/bogota-taxi-drivers-protest-against-uber/; 
Traffic Chaos and Violence as Thousands of Taxi Drivers Protest Against Uber 
in Jakarta, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2016, 2:23 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/22/traffic-chaos-and-violence-as-
thousands-of-taxi-drivers-protest-uber-in-jakarta; Gwyn Topham, Black-Cab 
Drivers’ Uber Protest Brings London Traffic to a Standstill, THE GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 10, 2016, 1:13 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/10/black-cab-drivers-uber-
protest-london-traffic-standstill. 
 30 See Jason Cieslak, What We Can Learn from Uber’s Logo Debacle, FORBES 
(Feb. 4, 2016, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2016/02/04/what-we-can-learn-from-
ubers-logo-debacle/#56e7576e2fa8; Maya Kosoff, Has Uber Finally Met Its 
Match?, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 25, 2016, 2:54 PM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/02/has-uber-finally-met-its-match; Sarah 
McBride, Ride Service Uber, Brash Darling of Silicon Valley, Stalks New 
Markets, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
transport-uber-idUSBREA010SP20140102. 
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one of the most powerful companies in the country,31 Uber was 
valued at $62.5 billion at the end of 2015.32 
The app works as follows: A user, a would-be passenger, logs 
into the app when he needs a ride,33 entering his destination into 
the app.34 Another user interested in giving him a ride, a would-be 
driver, connects with him on the app and starts driving to the 
passenger’s location to pick him up and drive him to his 
destination. 35  While Uber allows the driver to accept (or not 
accept) the passenger’s ride request,36 the passenger cannot choose 
                                                
 31  Dylan Roach & Alex Morrell, The 50 Most Powerful Companies in 
America, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2015, 12:28 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/50-most-powerful-companies-in-america-2015-
10. 
 32 Mike Isaac & Leslie Picker, Uber Valuation Put at $62.5 Billion After a 
New Investment Round, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/business/dealbook/uber-nears-investment-
at-a-62-5-billion-valuation.html?_r=1. 
 33 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016); How Does Uber Work?, supra note 7. In most cities, 
the ride is booked on demand: when the passenger needs the ride and only then. 
Hence in those cities, the app does not allow for ride reservations. See Can I 
Make a Reservation?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/63165ec1-0910-409e-972f-
0b8d8df1a605 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 34  Requesting and Taking an Uber Ride, UBER, 
https://help.uber.com/h/2a9d2594-3aea-4f66-9724-32d0da1868d5, (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016). 
 35 See Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4; Requesting and Taking an 
Uber Ride, supra note 34. 
 36 Uber sends the ride request from the passenger to the closest driver, and that 
driver has to accept the ride request before the ride between passenger and 
driver is arranged. The driver reportedly has fifteen seconds to accept the 
request before it is automatically sent to another driver nearby. See Can I 
Request a Specific Driver?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/1aaf0913-484f-4695-
9042-e61fc7613f24 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); James Cook, Uber’s Internal 
Charts Show How Its Driver-Rating System Actually Works, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 
11, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-charts-show-how-
ubers-driver-rating-system-works-2015-2#ixzz3gpV8n1sK. Likely to promote 
the speed and efficiency of ride connections, and therefore of the app itself, it 
has been reported that Uber demands drivers maintain a ride request acceptance 
rate of at least eighty percent. Cook, supra. But see Rachel Emma Silverman & 
Lauren Weber, Uber Reaches a Tipping Point with Its Drivers, WALL STREET J. 
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his driver.37 The only way for a passenger to get another driver is 
by aborting the ride request and starting over.38 
Uber sets the price of the ride, which is determined by its 
algorithm based on supply and demand at the time the app user 
requests a ride.39 At the end of the ride, the app automatically 
                                                                                                         
(Apr. 24, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-reaches-a-tipping-
point-with-its-drivers-1461490205 (reporting that Uber will soon relax its 
requirement for drivers to maintain a high ride request acceptance rate). 
Furthermore, the passenger’s destination would not be disclosed to the driver 
until after the passenger is picked up, likely to ensure that passengers are 
reliably picked up when using the app (as opposed to allowing drivers to shop 
for passengers whose destinations are more convenient to them), thus promoting 
passengers’ satisfaction with the app. See Harry Campbell, Just How Far Is 
Your Uber Driver Willing To Take You?, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2015, 12:33 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrycampbell/2015/03/24/just-how-far-is-your-
uber-driver-willing-to-take-you/#5a0e7075346e; Jessica Hullinger, 16 Things 
You Might Not Know About Uber and Its Drivers, MENTAL FLOSS (Jan. 19, 2016, 
11:17 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/67010/16-things-you-might-not-
know-about-uber-and-its-drivers; Jason Koebler, Anatomy of a Seven-Hour, 
$583 Uber Ride, MOTHERBOARD (June 17, 2015, 10:24 AM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/anatomy-of-a-seven-hour-583-uber-ride; Joe 
Strandell, Can You Beat My Longest Uber Ride Ever?, THE RIDESHARE GUY 
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://therideshareguy.com/can-you-beat-my-longest-uber-ride-
ever/. 
 37 Can I Request a Specific Driver?, supra note 36; see also Can I Make a 
Reservation?, supra note 33. United States Senator Ben Sasse made headlines 
recently when he decided to drive for Uber for a day to spend time with and 
listen to his constituents. One of his passengers, a college student named Adrian 
Silva, reported that he was pleasantly surprised upon seeing on the screen that he 
was being picked up by Senator Sasse himself. Silva initially thought that this 
was a joke, before realizing that it was not. Silva’s reaction of surprise and 
initial disbelief makes sense in the context of the fact that Uber passengers do 
not choose their drivers. See Cora Lewis, This Guy Got in an Uber and 
Discovered His Driver Was a U.S. Senator, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016, 
3:18 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/coralewis/uber-
senator?utm_term=.glKzvA15V#.ry4r5e9py. 
 38 See Can I Request a Specific Driver?, supra note 36; Cancelling an Uber 
Ride, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/56270015-1d1d-4c08-a460-3b94a090de23 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 39 Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4; Johanna Interian, Note, Up in 
the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 152-53 (2016); see also How Are Fares 
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charges the passenger’s credit card on file.40 Uber then retains a 
percentage of the fare as a fee41 and sends the remainder to the 
driver.42 Thus, the system does not allow for negotiations on the 
fare between users.43 
After the ride, the passenger and the driver rate each other on 
the app.44 Drivers with poor ratings45 may have their accounts 
deactivated by Uber.46 
                                                                                                         
Calculated?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/33ed4293-383c-4d73-a610-
d171d3aa5a78 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); Dan Kedmey, This Is How Uber’s 
‘Surge Pricing’ Works, TIME (Dec. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3633469/uber-
surge-pricing/; What Is Dynamic Pricing?, UBER, 
https://help.uber.com/h/34212e8b-d69a-4d8a-a923-095d3075b487 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016). 
 40 Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4. 
 41 The fee is typically between twenty to twenty-five percent of the fare. 
Silverman & Weber, supra note 36; see also Hullinger, supra note 36. 
 42 Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4. 
 43 Tipping is not included in the fare, and the practice is not compulsory. In 
fact, the app was originally designed so that no cash would change hands 
between users. See Can the Uber App Tip My Driver?, UBER, 
https://help.uber.com/h/f7385bf5-1748-4fd0-a57f-3d9b62facc45 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016) (clarifying that tipping is voluntary and emphasizing that “in 
most cities, Uber is a cashless experience”). Indeed, tipping is a relatively recent 
practice for Uber users as Uber has only recently allowed passengers to tip 
drivers, following its $100 million settlement of a class action suit with its 
drivers in April 2016. Silverman & Weber, supra note 36. Even with the new 
practice of tipping, however, Uber has stated that it had no plans to incorporate 
tipping into its app, which would preserve the price-setting of the fare as being 
under the exclusive domain of Uber. See id. 
 44  Driver Deactivation Policy—US ONLY, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/deactivation-policy/us-multi-lingual/en/ (last visited 
June 15, 2016); How Does Uber Work?, supra note 7; see also Hullinger, supra 
note 36. 
 45 A bad rating was once defined by Uber’s San Francisco office, in an 
internal document leaked to the media, as less than a “4.6” on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Cook, supra note 36. A “4.6” also seems to be the rating required of drivers in 
Melbourne, Australia. See How To Get 5-Star Rating?, UBER MELBOURNE, 
https://drive.uber.com/melbourne/how-can-we-help/how-to-uber/vicquality/ 
(last visited June 16, 2016). Uber does state on its website, however, that the 
required minimum average rating varies in different cities, allowing for cultural 
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Uber is part of the larger so-called sharing economy, 
sometimes called “gig” 47  or “on-demand” economy, 48  a 
marketplace that is increasingly characterized by users of a 
communications platform sharing their resources with each 
other—everything from homes to goods to transportation.49 Airbnb, 
for example, is a popular website that connects travelers seeking a 
space to stay with hosts who list an available space, whether a 
private room, an entire house, “tree houses in the woods . . . or 
enchanted castles.”50 Users (both hosts and guests) rate each other, 
allowing the community to build trust and to measure other users’ 
dependability.51 StubHub, another popular website, is an online 
                                                                                                         
differences in how users rate each other in the different locales. Driver 
Deactivation Policy—US ONLY, supra note 44. 
 46 Driver Deactivation Policy—US ONLY, supra note 44; see also Harry 
Campbell, 11 Things That Can Get You Deactivated as an Uber Driver, THE 
RIDESHARE GUY (Oct. 19, 2015), http://therideshareguy.com/10-things-that-can-
get-you-deactivated-as-an-uber-driver/; Cook, supra note 36. 
 47 Eric Goldman, Top 10 Internet Law Developments of 2015, TECH. & MKTG. 
L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/02/top-10-
internet-law-developments-of-2015-forbes-cross-post.htm. 
 48 Zalmi Duchman, The On-Demand Economy Is Here To Stay, and Now Is 




 49 Brittany McNamara, Note, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 149, 151 (2015); see Charles Green, Trusting and 
Being Trusted in the Sharing Economy, FORBES (May 2, 2012, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/trustedadvisor/2012/05/02/trusting-and-being-
trusted-in-the-sharing-economy/#703be2e6608a; Randy White, The Sharing 
Economy: “Plan B” for Moving America Forward, TEDXSOMA (June 28, 
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2yXFmcl7V8. 
 50  Who Can Host on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/18/who-can-host-on-airbnb (last visited Feb. 
07, 2017); see also McNamara, supra note 49, at 151–55; Tomio Geron, Airbnb 
and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/#3ec449326790. 
 51  How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13/how-do-reviews-work (last visited Nov. 
17, 2016); see also It All Starts with Our Standards, AIRBNB, 
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ticket marketplace, connecting users who are selling tickets to 
sports games, concerts, or shows with other users seeking to buy 
the tickets.52  
Uber and the web-based sharing economy have grown so 
rapidly that there is much uncertainty surrounding how different 
laws and regulations should be applied to them.53 Of interest in this 
article is how the immunity under the Communications Decency 
Act would be applied to Uber. 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
The Communications Decency Act provides that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”54 Enacted by Congress in 1996, a 
key rationale is to promote the development of the then-nascent 
Internet 55  and to “encourage the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals . . . who use the Internet and other interactive computer 
services.” 56  Originally passed to protect interactive computer 
services from defamatory content provided by third-party users, 
the statute has been expansively applied beyond defamation suits 
to protect interactive computer services from fraud, negligence, 
                                                                                                         
https://www.airbnb.com/trust (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); McNamara, supra 
note 49, at 152. 
 52 About Us, STUBHUB, http://www.stubhub.com/about-us/ (last visited June 
14, 2016); see also Matthew Feuerman, Note, Court-Side Seats? The 
Communications Decency Act and the Potential Threat to StubHub and Peer-to-
Peer Marketplaces, 57 B.C. L. REV. 227, 228–29 (2016). 
 53 See Virginia A. Fitt, Electronic Commerce Law: Crowdsourcing the News: 
News Organization Liability for iReporters, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1839, 
1858 (2011); Interian, supra note 39, at 151–53, 156. See generally McNamara, 
supra note 49, at 154–55, 159–70. 
 54 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 55 See id. § (b)(1). 
 56 Id. § (b)(3). 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation, and 
invasion of privacy.57 
Courts have employed a three-pronged test in assessing 
whether a defendant should receive immunity under the 
Communications Decency Act. A defendant is protected under the 
statute when (1) the defendant is a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service, (2) the information for which the 
plaintiff is suing is provided by another information content 
provider, and (3) the lawsuit seeks to treat the defendant as the 
publisher or speaker of that information.58 A closer look at each 
prong follows. 
A. What Is a Provider of an Interactive Computer Service? 
An interactive computer service is defined by the statute as 
“any information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet . . . .” 59 
                                                
 57 Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 
(4th Cir. 2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); 
Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726–33 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Doe v. 
Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 
2006); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 
2003); Matthew Altenberg, Note, Playing the Mysterious Game of Online Love: 
Examining an Emerging Trend of Limiting § 230 Immunity of the 
Communications Decency Act and the Effects on E-Dating Websites, 32 PACE L. 
REV. 922, 938–39 (2012); Feuerman, supra note 52, at 234 (“Originally applied 
predominantly to defamation cases, CDA immunity has been interpreted to 
apply to any civil suit claiming vicarious liability for websites.”); Dan 
Malachowski, Comment, “Username Jacking” in Social Media: Should 
Celebrities and Brand Owners Recover from Social Networking Sites when 
Their Social Media Usernames Are Stolen?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 223, 233–34 
(2010). 
 58 Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 
2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d at 418; Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 59 § 230(f)(2). 
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Courts have adopted an “expansive definition” of a provider of 
an interactive computer service.60 A website, not surprisingly, is a 
provider of an interactive computer service as it “functions as an 
intermediary by providing a forum for the exchange of information 
between third[-]party users.”61 The designation has also included 
websites that host message boards62 (even the employer’s e-mail 
system), 63  as well as websites that invite or encourage user 
comments.64 
More specifically, the designation of a provider of an 
interactive computer service has been applied to Internet service 
providers and search engines such as Google, 65  Yahoo, 66  and 
AOL;67 retail sites such as Amazon68 and eBay,69 in which users 
“conduct sales transactions” and “provide information (feedback) 
about other users of the service”;70 Craigslist, an Internet bulletin 
                                                
 60 Cornelius v. DeLuca, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1021 (D. Idaho 2010); see 
Optinrealbig.com, L.L.C. v. Ironport Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1044 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) (“Courts construing § 230(f)(2) have recognized that the definition 
includes a wide range of cyberspace services, not only internet service 
providers.”). This article focuses on the “provider” aspect of an interactive 
computer service, not the “user” aspect, as this article seeks to explore Uber’s 
liability under the Communications Decency Act, and Uber would be a provider, 
not a user of its own service. See infra Part III. 
 61 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 62  Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc., 478 F.3d at 419; Dimeo v. Max, 248 F. 
App’x. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 63 Delfino v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 389 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 64 Spreadbury v. Biterroot Pub. Library, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (D. Mont. 
2012). 
 65 Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 2010); 
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197–99 (N.D. Cal. 2009); 
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 66 Stayart v. Yahoo!, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
 67 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 68 Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. Wash. 
2014); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 69 Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 n.7 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 70 Id. 
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board site;71 Yelp, an online review website;72 an online dating 
website;73 social media sites such as Facebook74 and MySpace;75 
and sharing economy sites such as StubHub76 and eBay.77    
B. Who Provided the Content? 
There is no immunity under the Communications Decency Act 
if the online entity itself is the one providing the content, because 
the content must have originated from “another information 
content provider.”78 An information content provider is defined by 
the statute as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”79 
Content “creation” is easier to define than content 
“development,” 80  both of which are subsumed under the 
Communications Decency Act’s definition of information content 
                                                
 71 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 
961, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53246, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009). 
 72 Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Reit 
v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413–14 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 73 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 74 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 75 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 76 Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 77 Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 n.7 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 78  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009); MySpace, Inc., 
528 F.3d at 418–19; Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 
2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030–31, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123–24; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 
206 F.3d 980, 984–86 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 79 § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added). 
 80  Feuerman, supra note 52, at 233; Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky 
“Development”: How the Ninth Circuit Exposed Ambiguity Within the 
Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 267, 291 (2008). 
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provider.81 Certainly a third-party user of a social media site who 
posts on the site is the creator of that content (the content being the 
post), and the user would therefore be “another information content 
provider” under the statute.82 In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., for example, 
a minor misrepresented her age as eighteen years old on the social 
media website MySpace, which led to an adult contacting her 
through the site, subsequently meeting her in person and sexually 
assaulting her.83 When the minor’s mother sued MySpace, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling that protected MySpace 
from liability under the statute because the minor was the creator 
of her own profile.84  
As websites have become more interactive, however, as one 
commentator put it, “the line between the website and the users of 
the website blurs.”85 This is evident in Fair Housing Council of 
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 86  the seminal 
Ninth Circuit case that defines what it means to be an information 
content provider by way of developing content, rather than creating 
it.87 
                                                
 81 See § 230(f)(3). 
 82 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Johnson v. 
Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., 591 F.3d at 
254–55. 
 83 MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 416. 
 84 Id. at 420, 422. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that MySpace 
shared the creation of the content with the minor user due to the site’s 
facilitating the creation of users’ profiles through a questionnaire and due to the 
site’s search feature, ultimately because the plaintiff had failed to present the 
argument to the lower court. Id. at 422. The court did, however, signal that the 
argument would not have been a winning one. See id. at 420. 
 85 Weslander, supra note 80, at 293. 
 86 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 87 Id. at 1162–63. Roommates.com, a website that connected renters with 
those looking for roommates, was held to be a content provider when the 
website created discriminatory questions and choice of answers, forcing users to 
participate in them by answering the questions as a requirement of using the 
website. Id. at 1161–62, 1163, 1167. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 
structure of the website was such that it did not merely provide a framework 
which users could then freely use for whatever purpose, be it illegal. Id. at 1172. 
The Ninth Circuit contrasted its holding in Roommates with its holding in 
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Of content development and immunity under the statute, the 
court in Roommates stated, “The message to website operators is 
clear: If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your 
website to require users to input illegal content, you will be 
immune.”88 In light of this rule, two different tests have been 
employed by other courts in determining whether a website’s 
content development precludes it from enjoying immunity under 
the Communications Decency Act. 
Under the more relaxed “encouragement” test, merely 
encouraging or inducing the development of illegal content, as 
contrasted with providing a neutral framework for users, would 
result in the website being deemed a developer of that content and 
thus an information content provider.89 Under the more stringent 
“requirement” test, a website must have materially contributed to 
the illegal content by requiring users to post the content for it to be 
deemed a developer of the content and an information content 
provider.90 
                                                                                                         
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., in which the defendant dating website was 
found not to be a content provider when the website had created the framework 
of site usage in the form of questions that users must fill out to use the service, 
but the offensive content at issue was created solely by the user. Id. at 1171–72; 
cf. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122–24 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Although the facts of the case are similar to Roommates, the critical difference is 
that in Carafano, the website-created framework did not have to do with the 
offensive content at issue—the website played no part in encouraging or 
requiring the illegal act. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172. 
 88 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis added). 
 89  Jeffrey R. Doty, Note, Inducement or Solicitation? Competing 
Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roomates.com, 
6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 126–27, 130–32, 136 (2010); Ryan J. P. Dyer, 
Comment, The Communication[s] Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for 
Renewing the Presumption Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837, 
845, 860 (2014); Feuerman, supra note 52, at 238; see, e.g., Jones v. Dirty 
World Entm’t Recordings, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 398, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 90 Doty, supra note 89, at 126–27, 130–32; Dyer, supra note 89; Feuerman, 
supra note 52, at 239; see, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 413–17. For example, 
Amazon was not a content provider when it provided tools through its zShops 
platform for third-party users to post information on its site and furthermore 
encouraged users to use these tools, because users ultimately made their own 
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The Ninth Circuit took a rather novel and expansive 
interpretation of the statute in Roommates,91 and the case has been 
criticized for its “vague and varying articulations” with regard to 
the basis of liability, which has led to the two different tests 
above.92 
The dissent in Roommates also criticizes the majority for 
adding the requirement that the content be unlawful for immunity 
to attach, when in fact the Communications Decency Act has no 
such requirement in its language.93 The dissent points out that the 
statute examines only whether the content was provided by the 
website, which would be independent from the inquiry of whether 
the content was unlawful.94 While the issue in Roommates has to 
do with the liability of an information content provider specifically 
by way of developing content,95 this unlawfulness requirement has 
                                                                                                         
decision about what information to put on the site. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 91 Feuerman, supra note 52, at 237; Weslander, supra note 80, at 291. 
 92 Doty, supra note 89, at 130; see Dyer, supra note 89, at 844; see also 
Weslander, supra note 80, at 290–94. 
 93 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 94 Id. 
[The majority’s] definition is original to say the least and springs forth 
untethered to anything in the statute. 
 The . . . definition of “development” epitomizes its consistent 
collapse of substantive liability with the issue of immunity. Where in 
the statute does Congress say anything about unlawfulness? Whether 
Roommate is entitled to immunity for publishing and sorting profiles is 
wholly distinct from whether Roommate may be liable for violations of 
the FHA. Immunity has meaning only when there is something to be 
immune from, whether a disease or the violation of a law. It would be 
nonsense to claim to be immune only from the innocuous. But the 
majority’s immunity analysis is built on substantive liability: to the 
majority, CDA immunity depends on whether a webhost 
materially contributed to the unlawfulness of the information. Whether 
the information at issue is unlawful and whether the webhost has 
contributed to its unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of 
the determination of immunity. Id. 
 95 Id. at 1162–63 (majority opinion). 
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been picked up and attached to the broader definition of 
information content provider.96 
It is noteworthy that websites are free to edit content provided 
by third-party users without incurring liability as information 
content provider.97 This editing function includes choosing which 
content authored by third-party users would be published on the 
site,98 making minor alterations to the content,99 deleting errors 
found in the content,100 and making selective content deletion.101 
Additionally, courts have been clear that a website is not a 
content provider when it “provides a neutral means by which third 
parties can post information of their own independent choosing 
online.”102 For example, sharing economy website StubHub103 was 
not a content provider when its pricing tool on the website did 
nothing more than provide information on the prices of tickets to 
the same event that had been sold on the site previously.104 The 
court said that StubHub’s pricing tool was the “prototypically 
‘neutral tool’” because it provided information “without suggesting, 
much less requiring” users to set any particular price on the 
tickets.105 Rather, third-party sellers as users set their own prices on 
the site.106 Google went a step further than StubHub by providing 
suggestions of certain keywords to bidders in its AdWords 
program,107 but it too was found not to have been a content 
                                                
 96 See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 
254 (4th Cir. 2009); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 97 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 98 Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 926–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 99 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. 
 100 Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th 
Cir. 2000). 
 101 Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 102 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also 
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 103 See About Us, STUBHUB, supra note 52. 
 104 Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 562 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 561–62. 
 107 Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
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provider under the statute because the bidders could still “adopt or 
reject [the keywords] at their discretion.” 108  In so doing, the 
program merely helped bidders “refine their content,”109 and so it 
was a “neutral tool” for bidders as users of the site.110 
Lastly, it is noteworthy that the court in StubHub found the 
sharing economy website111 immune when its business model was 
such that it was a “broker” in connecting users, who were buyers 
and sellers of tickets to various events, to conduct their own 
transactions (with the sellers setting the price, as discussed 
above).112 Put another way, StubHub’s website was the meeting 
place for these users who were interested in buying and selling 
tickets, and users were free to make their own interactions and 
sales 113 —StubHub did not systematically require certain user 
connections or sales to occur, or, conversely, restrict connections 
or sales between any particular users.114 This brokering function is 
apparent in Airbnb, for example, being another sharing economy 
website, which also neither systematically requires certain user 
connections or bookings to occur nor restricts them from 
occurring.115 
C. What Is a Publisher? 
As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals explained, 
“Although the [Communications Decency Act] does not define 
‘publisher,’ its ordinary meaning is ‘one that makes public,’ and 
‘the reproducer of a work intended for public consumption.’ 
Indeed, the very essence of publishing is making the decision 
whether to print or retract a given piece of content . . . .”116 Thus, 
                                                
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See About Us, STUBHUB, supra note 52. 
 112 Hill v. StubHub, Inc.,727 S.E.2d 550, 552, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 113 See id. at 552–53, 561–63. 
 114 See id. at 561–63. 
 115 See Interian, supra note 39, at 153. 
 116 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted). 
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the function of a publisher includes choosing what to publish 
among proffered material, 117  editing, archiving, caching, 
monitoring, screening, providing access to, postponing, and 
deleting content118—or conversely, deciding not to do anything to 
the content at all.119 
The broad definition has, not surprisingly, yielded a 
designation of publisher to an array of types of websites, from 
Internet service providers and search engines such as Google,120 
Yahoo, 121  and AOL; 122  retail sites like Amazon 123  and eBay; 124 
Craigslist, an Internet bulletin board site;125 Yelp, an online review 
website;126 an online dating website;127 social media sites such as 
Facebook128 and MySpace;129 to sharing economy sites such as 
StubHub130 and eBay.131   
                                                
 117 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 118 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe 
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 
318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 
(4th Cir. 1997); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 
2007); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 119 Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706–09, 715 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 120 See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 631; see also Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 
500–01. 
 121 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. 
 122 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 123 See Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1106–07 (W.D. 
Wash. 2014); see also Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 41–42 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 124 Gentry, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706–09, 715. 
 125 See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 
F. Supp. 2d 961, 965–66 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 
7735 (RMB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53246 at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009). 
 126 Reit v Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 127 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 128 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 129 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419–20 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 130 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 552, 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 131 Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706–09, 715 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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III. WHY UBER WOULD NOT BE IMMUNE UNDER THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
How would Uber fare under the Communications Decency 
Act? Uber has been steadfast in its characterization that it is not a 
transportation company, but rather a technology company, one that 
provides a ride-sharing platform for users to connect by soliciting 
rides from and generate ratings for each other.132 In other words, 
Uber would argue that it would qualify for immunity under the 
Communications Decency Act as a tech platform—that it is just 
like other tech platforms and websites that have found to be 
immune under the statute. As late as 2014, Uber’s in-house 
attorney likened getting a ride using the Uber app to arranging a 
ride with a friend on Facebook: “If you . . . got in an accident, . . . 
the social media site [Facebook] would not be liable.”133 
It is telling that a federal district court in California (in an order 
denying Uber’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
whether Uber’s drivers should be categorized as employees, which 
took place before Uber’s ensuing settlement with its drivers) 
                                                
 132 See Order Denying Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 10, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2015) (No. C-13-3826 EMC); Order, Decision or Award of the Labor 
Commissioner at 9, Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK (Labor 
Comm’r Cal. June 16, 2015); Ward, supra note 24, at 14; Huet, supra note 11; 
Legal Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/other/US-
terms-pre-Nov-2016/ (last visited June 29, 2016). 
The Services constitute a technology platform that enables users of 
Uber’s mobile applications or websites provided as part of the Services 
(each, an “Application”) to arrange and schedule transportation and/or 
logistics services with third party providers of such services, including 
independent third party transportation providers and third party 
logistics providers under agreement with Uber or certain of Uber’s 
affiliates (“Third Party Providers”) . . . . YOU ACKNOWLEDGE 
THAT UBER DOES NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION OR 
LOGISTICS SERVICES OR FUNCTION AS A TRANSPORTATION 
CARRIER.  
Legal Terms and Conditions, supra. 
 133 Ward, supra note 24, at 14, 17. 
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rejected Uber’s characterization of itself as merely a technology 
company as “fatally flawed.”134 
Uber’s self-definition as a mere “technology company” 
focuses exclusively on the mechanics of its platform (i.e., 
the use of internet enabled smartphones and software 
applications) rather than on the substance of what Uber 
actually does (i.e., enable customers to book and receive 
rides). This is an unduly narrow frame. Uber engineered a 
software method to connect drivers with passengers, but 
this is merely one instrumentality used in the context of its 
larger business. Uber does not simply sell software; it sells 
rides. Uber is no more a “technology company” than 
Yellow Cab is a “technology company” because it uses CB 
radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a “technology 
company” because it uses computers and robots to 
manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a 
“technology company” because it uses modern irrigation 
techniques to grow its sugar cane. Indeed, very few (if any) 
firms are not technology companies if one focuses solely 
on how they create or distribute their products. If, however, 
the focus is on the substance of what the firm actually does 
(e.g., sells cab rides, lawn mowers, or sugar), it is clear that 
Uber is most certainly a transportation company, albeit a 
technologically sophisticated one. In fact, as noted above, 
Uber’s own marketing bears this out, referring to Uber as 
“Everyone’s Private Driver,” and describing Uber as a 
“transportation system” and the “best transportation service 
in San Francisco.”135 
Indeed, while some analysts have called for Communications 
Decency Act immunity to be extended to Uber, largely as a 
measure to protect the growth of the sharing economy industry,136 
                                                
 134  Order Denying Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. C-13-3826 EMC). 
 135 Id. at 10–11. 
 136 See, e.g., Feuerman, supra note 52, at 242–43; McNamara, supra note 49, 
at 166, 169. 
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many have argued for a contraction of Communications Decency 
Act immunity as the Internet has grown immensely since the 
passage of the Act and argued for a limitation of how the immunity 
should be applied to sharing economy businesses in particular.137  
Much is unsettled about how Communications Decency Act 
immunity would be fitted to sharing economy businesses,138 but as 
will be shown below, Uber’s particular business model would 
disqualify the company from enjoying immunity under the statute. 
Uber would likely easily meet the first and third prongs of the 
test for immunity: whether the website is a provider of an 
interactive computer service139 and whether the website is the 
publisher of the content, respectively.140 With regard to the first 
prong, as courts have been expansive in their definition of a 
provider of an interactive computer service, 141  there has been 
consistency in finding websites of all types to be providers of an 
interactive computer service.142 StubHub, for example, a sharing 
                                                
 137 Altenberg, supra note 57, at 948–53; Dyer, supra note 89, at 841–42, 855–
58; Interian, supra note 39, at 160–61; see also Weslander, supra note 80, at 278, 
284.  
“[F]or websites, this [expectation against liability] is codified in law—
they are not legally responsible for what their users publish, according 
to the Communications Decency Act, perhaps the most influential law 
in the development of the web. That is why Yelp avoids liability when 
people post inaccurate or abusive restaurant reviews, and why 
YouTube does not have to remove videos that some find offensive. 
 The law protects online speech, not actions people take in the 
offline world. Yet its ethos has permeated Silicon Valley so deeply that 
people invoke it even for things that happen offline. 
 ‘These folks grew up in a world where platforms are not 
responsible, and then when they go do stuff in the real world, they 
expect that to be the case,’ said Ryan Calo, an assistant professor at the 
University of Washington law school who studies cyber law.”  
Miller, supra note 14.  
 138 See Fitt, supra note 53; Interian, supra note 39, at 151–53, 156. See 
generally McNamara, supra note 49, at 154–55, 159–70. 
 139 See supra Part II(A). 
 140 See supra Part II(C). 
 141 See supra Part II(A). 
 142 See supra Part II(A). 
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economy website like Uber, has been found to be a provider.143 As 
Uber provides access to its Internet-based app for its users 
(passengers and drivers) and provides a forum through its app for 
users to exchange information for the purposes of arranging a 
ride,144 Uber would be a provider of an interactive computer service 
under the statute, thus satisfying the first prong. 
With regard to the third prong, courts have similarly been 
liberal in defining what a publisher is.145 A generous range of 
activities by websites of all types has qualified under the function 
of a publisher. 146  Of note, StubHub, again, being a sharing 
economy website, has been found to be a publisher.147 Uber’s 
activity in connecting passengers and drivers for their ride on its 
app148 would likely fall under the function of a publisher under the 
statute, thus satisfying the third prong. 
But Uber would have difficulty meeting the second prong: 
whether a third party provided the content on the computer 
service.149 While passengers and drivers do provide some content 
as third-party users of the app—first by signing up to use the Uber 
app, then by requesting a ride as a passenger and by responding to 
a ride request as a driver150—Uber also provides content by setting 
the price of the ride and by commanding heavy control over user 
ride connections. 
A. Price-Setting and Providing Content 
As Uber sets the price for the ride,151 Uber creates that piece of 
information in the interaction between its third-party users. 
Passengers and drivers as users have no say or contribution to the 
                                                
 143 Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 144 See supra Part I. 
 145 See supra Part II(C). 
 146 See supra Part II(C). 
 147 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 552, 557. 
 148 See supra Part I. 
 149 See supra Part II(B). 
 150 See supra Part I. 
 151 See supra note 39. 
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price; this content is created solely by Uber.152 Uber’s role here as a 
content creator is more easily discernible than some other websites’ 
role as a content developer to an extent that would trigger liability, 
as the Roommates court was concerned,153 because Uber actually 
creates the content by setting the price outright. 
Neither does Uber’s price-setting mechanism function as a 
neutral tool for users, as would be required so as not to be a 
content provider.154 Of the two websites whose mechanisms were 
found to be neutral tools discussed previously, StubHub and 
Google,155 it is precisely because StubHub’s pricing tool neither 
suggested nor required sellers to sell their event tickets at any 
particular price that it was found to be a “neutral tool” for users; 
sellers were free to choose whatever price at which to list their 
tickets. 156  Similarly, although Google’s AdWords program 
provided suggestions of certain keywords, it did not require users 
to take up those keywords, and it was found to be a “neutral tool” 
for users.157 Bidders could still “adopt or reject [the keywords] at 
their discretion.”158 
Uber’s price-setting mechanism stands in stark contrast to these 
two tools: It requires users to agree to a price for the ride set by 
Uber through its algorithm without any input from users,159 and 
thus is not a neutral tool for users. As such, this mechanism goes 
beyond being an editing function permitted for websites within the 
prong160 (after all, there is no content to edit if users have no input 
whatsoever on the price of the ride)—it is providing the content 
itself. 
                                                
 152 See supra notes 39, 43. 
 153 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 
521 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 154 See supra Part II(B). 
 155 See supra Part II(B). 
 156 Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 561–62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 157 Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 158 Id. 
 159 See Interian, supra note 39, at 153; see sources cited supra notes 39, 43. 
 160 See supra Part II(B). 
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It is true that the context for Uber differs from many 
Communications Decency Act cases in that the reason Uber would 
be sued is likely not because the price being set by Uber is per se 
unlawful,161 but because the ride connection made through Uber 
has caused some sort of an accident or injury due to negligence or 
intentional acts.162 In this scenario, though, the event that would 
likely trigger the lawsuit would not happen without the ride 
connection having been made through Uber, and the price of the 
ride is a necessary part of that connection, with Uber being the 
entity that sets the price. The price of the ride being set by Uber is 
not severable from the injury-causing ride itself. 
A better analysis of the scenario, however, would examine 
Uber’s role as a content provider by setting the price against the 
plain language of the Communications Decency Act. There is 
nothing in the statute that requires the content at issue to be 
unlawful—the statute examines only whether the content was 
provided by a third-party for immunity to attach.163 Indeed, it is 
revealing that in the aforementioned Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,164 the 
court does not distinguish between the content that was itself 
unlawful in nature165 and the content that led to the unlawful 
event.166 
                                                
 161 As opposed to, for example, a website being sued for a defamatory posting 
authored by a third-party user—the classic fact pattern for Communications 
Decency Act cases. See supra note 57. 
 162 See supra note 11. 
 163 See supra Part II(B). 
 164 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418–22 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Which is the case in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., as it was not the posting made 
by the minor that was the reason for the lawsuit, but rather the sexual assault that 
followed the posting by the minor. Id. at 415–17. Thus the posting made by the 
minor made a way for, or led to, the unlawful event against her—analogous to 
the scenario likely facing Uber in lawsuit. See supra note 11. A critical 
difference here is MySpace was not a content provider (the third-party minor 
user was the content creator by setting up her profile), while Uber is taking on 
the role of content provider by setting the price for the ride between third-party 
users. See sources cited supra notes 39, 43. 
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Thus the analysis for Uber should be focused on the price as 
the content being set solely by Uber, independent of whether that 
content is unlawful. Uber creates the content that is the price of the 
ride for its users, and that role should suffice to render Uber as an 
information content provider.167 
B. Controlling User Connections and Providing Content 
Additionally, Uber controls aspects of user connections by 
sending a passenger’s ride request to a particular driver168 and by 
not allowing passengers to pick their drivers.169 As far as third-
party users using the app are concerned, the app does not provide a 
neutral means for them to connect with other users freely. 
To elaborate, while there is some freedom for a driver to accept 
or decline a ride request,170 a driver is not given access on the app 
to see all ride requests being made on Uber (or to choose from that 
pool).171 Rather, ride requests come to him one at a time, delegated 
by Uber.172 For a passenger, there is much less freedom. The 
passenger has no choice in drivers.173 Once the ride request has 
been accepted by a driver, the only way out of the now-already 
                                                
 167 See also Ward, supra note 24, at 14. 
 Timothy Alger, a litigation partner at the firm Perkins Coie, said of ride-
sharing app companies like Uber, “If you are just an app that’s collecting user-
generated content on one side, and people are able to pick and choose if they 
want to hire a service, that to me would have immunity under the 
Communications Decency Act,” but  
“[i]f a service is setting the price from Midtown to Wall Street at $10, then 
under the law that might be considered something that is not just a publisher’s 
role.” Id. Other experts have voiced a similar view. Professor Eric Goldman, an 
Internet Law scholar, and Venkat Balasubramani, an attorney specializing in 
Internet litigation, have both expressed uncertainty over whether Uber would 
qualify for Communications Decency Act protection due to its business model 
of setting the price for the ride and for controlling some measure of user 
connections. Huet, supra note 11. 
 168 See sources cited supra notes 35, 36. 
 169 See sources cited supra note 37. 
 170 See sources cited supra notes 35, 36. 
 171 See sources cited supra note 36. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See sources cited supra note 37. 
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arranged ride is for the passenger to abort the ride and make a new 
request.174 These systemic restrictions do not make for a “neutral 
tool” for users to make connections of their own “independent 
choosing,” as would be required of a website so as not to be a 
content provider.175 
It is true that websites are afforded an editing function within 
the prong without incurring liability as a content provider.176 But 
selecting which content would be published or making alterations 
to content—both permitted within the editing function 177 —is 
incongruous to channeling user connection systematically, as the 
latter is much more than editing. It is actively forming user 
connections and thus generating content. 
It is helpful to consider how other sharing economy websites 
such as StubHub and Airbnb freely allow users to make their own 
connections with each other.178 There are no restrictions for sellers 
and buyers of tickets to conduct a sale with each other on 
StubHub,179 and there are no restrictions for travelers and hosts to 
book a space with each other on Airbnb.180 
This “broker[ing]” function181 in connecting users represents 
the free marketplace espoused by the requirement of a neutral tool 
for users, 182  and a platform that allows for open connections 
between users is important to the determination that a website was 
not a content provider.183 Uber fails to provide a neutral tool for 
users by heavily controlling user connections and thus exposes 
itself to liability as an information content provider. 
                                                
 174 See supra note 38. 
 175 See supra Part II(B). 
 176 See supra Part II(B). 
 177 Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 926–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 178 See supra Part II(B). 
 179 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 552, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 180 See Interian, supra note 39, at 153. 
 181 Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 563. 
 182 See supra Part II(B). 
 183 See supra Part II(B). 
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C. Providing Content and Losing Immunity 
Given that Uber sets the price of the ride and heavily controls 
user connections, it is an information content provider under the 
Communications Decency Act. But the two practices are not 
dependent on each other in making Uber a content provider. As the 
analysis above shows, either practice is sufficient to render Uber a 
content provider.184 Thus, it would be too narrow of a construction 
to classify Uber as a content provider only from the moment a 
driver accepts a ride request from a particular passenger to the 
conclusion of the ride (because that is the timeframe in which 
Uber’s algorithm has set the price for the ride and the system has 
channeled the users to connect with each other). 
A more appropriate construction would categorize Uber as a 
content provider from the time the app is turned on by a driver 
seeking to pick up a ride, because turning on the app engages the 
Uber app system, which, among other functions, starts to engineer 
the channeling of user connections, even if it has yet to set a 
price.185 This position would render Uber a content provider in 
Sofia Liu’s case, and thus unprotected by the Communications 
Decency Act, because the driver had turned on the app and was 
waiting for a ride request to come through when he struck the 
family with his car.186 
Given that Uber is a content provider in the ride-sharing 
arrangement between users, immunity under the Communications 
Decency Act would not be properly conferred on the company 
when passengers, drivers, or bystanders sue Uber for an injury 
involving an Uber ride. Indeed, giving immunity under the statute 
when Uber sets the price for the ride would seem to be antithetical 
to the expressly stated Congressional policy behind the statute, to 
“encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
control,”187 because price-setting does not maximize user control. 
In the same manner, giving immunity when Uber commands so 
                                                
 184 See supra Part III(A), (B). 
 185 See supra Part I. 
 186 See sources cited supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 187 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2012). 
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much control over user connections does not maximize user 
control. 
CONCLUSION 
As Uber’s popularity increases and more people use its app to 
arrange ride-sharing, injuries to bystanders to the ride, as well as to 
passengers and drivers, have correspondingly increased. Uber 
asserts that it is a technology platform as opposed to a 
transportation company—a claim that would usually trigger the 
protection of the Communications Decency Act, which would 
insulate Uber from lawsuits for injuries involving those rides. The 
statute has robustly protected Web-based companies from liability 
based on content provided by third parties. 
But Uber employs a distinctive business model to other Web-
based companies that have been protected by the statute. First, 
Uber sets the price for the transactions between its users, creating 
that piece of information in the interaction between its third-party 
users. Uber’s price-setting mechanism function does not offer its 
users a neutral tool in using the app. Second, Uber exercises heavy 
control in user connections by orchestrating much of the ride 
connection between passenger and driver. As far as third-party 
users using the app are concerned, the app does not provide a 
neutral tool for them to make connections of their own independent 
choosing. 
These practices cause Uber to be more than just a technology 
platform—it is a content provider in the ride-sharing arrangement 
through its app. As a content provider, Uber would thus not qualify 
for immunity under the Communications Decency Act. 
 
